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 “Deepfake” technology employs Artificial Intelligence in order to manipulate video and 
audio content in a manner that is undetectable to consumers of this media. Deepfake technology 
can be used to produce videos of real individuals, saying and doing things that they never in fact 
said or did, that appear highly authentic. Controversy is already emerging with regard to this 
technology, as pornographic Deepfake content is being produced that exploits the likenesses of 
celebrities without their consent. Having accepted the premise that production and distribution of 
Deepfake content can constitute a legitimate form of expression, it is not immediately clear where 
the rights of content producers and distributors end, and where the rights of individuals whose 
likenesses are used in this content begin. This paper explores the question of whether it can be 
plausibly argued that Deepfake content involving the likenesses of real individuals violates the 
rights of these individuals. Three arguments in support of the view that Deepfake content can be 
legitimately constrained, on the grounds that it infringes upon individual rights, are considered. I 
name these the Privacy Argument, the Defamation Argument, and the Property Argument.1 My 
view is that the Property Argument provides the most robust and reliable strategy for assessing the 
legitimacy of Deepfake content and determining whether legal constraints should be placed on it. 
I argue that the strength of this argument lies in its relative simplicity and parsimony.2 I then offer 
a brief, supplementary discussion of “marketplace solutions,” i.e. strategies for regulating the 
 
1
 This is not a policy paper. While there are no doubt many laws in place in various jurisdictions that are related to privacy, defamation, and 
property, throughout this discussion I avoid examining any specific law in any specific jurisdiction. Since Deepfake technology has not yet been 
analyzed through a philosophical lens, the aim of this paper is to lay a conceptual groundwork that can shape future discussions about Deepfake 
technology and individual rights with a more direct emphasis on policy. 
2
 A philosophical literature is currently being developed that explores the relationship between online data collection and individual property 
rights. I believe that while there is room for intersection and overlap between this area and my own Property Argument, which is concerned 
specifically with Deepfake technology and the appropriation of individuals' likenesses, it is interesting to consider whether this argument ought to 
be situated within a broader debate about data ownership and collection. I will let readers arrive at their own conclusions with regard to this 
matter, as I here specifically emphasize issues surrounding Deepfake technology and do not deviate into the broader debate about data. Authors 
who have explored this area include Janeček (Janeček 2018) and Vold & Whittlestone (Vold & Whittlestone 2019). 
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production and distribution of Deepfake content that do not (necessarily) need to appeal to the 
concept of individual rights in order to retain their plausibility. 
 The arguments presented in this paper emphasize the language of individual rights rather 
than the language of harm and harm prevention. It is important to identify the theory of rights that 
informs this discussion, as well as its relationship with the concept of harm. The arguments that 
follow operate within a broadly liberal framework, in the sense that they accept as a premise that 
the state can only legitimately constrain other-regarding behaviours (as opposed to self-regarding 
behaviours) that cause harm. The fact that a behaviour is widely or strongly disliked is insufficient 
with respect to justifying state intervention seeking to constrain said behaviour. Within this liberal 
framework, to charge one with a rights violation also entails charging one with infliction of harm. 
To invade the privacy of an individual is thus to inflict harm upon that individual, and the same is 
true of defaming an individual, as well as illegitimately seizing an individual’s personal property. 
This liberal framework employs a Millian approach to limiting harm through force that is 
more demanding than alternative approaches.3 We can easily understand that making a cruel 
comment towards someone or being unfaithful towards a romantic partner can be harmful 
behaviours in the sense that they inflict pain that ought to be avoided, yet these behaviours do not 
satisfy the conditions required in order to justify state intervention within a Millian approach. 
While there are many possible deployments of Deepfake technology that are capable of having 
adverse effects on individuals, this fact alone does not establish that it is legitimate for such content 
to be constrained through force. Mill’s Harm Principle4 underpins a set of negative political rights, 
 
3
 Of course, there may be good reasons to doubt whether Mill’s understanding of harm is sound. I do not open that debate here. My arguments 
about Deepfake technology and individual rights are downstream from the debate about how harm ought to be understood. 
4
 John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, articulated in On Liberty, famously holds that “[t]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 2015: 13). Sumner explains that 
“[u]nder the Harm Principle harm to others is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for social interference with an activity” (Sumner 2004: 
25). 
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and the focus of this discussion is whether certain deployments of Deepfake technology can be 
determined to be at odds with (some of) these rights. Concerns about harm thus provide a 
conceptual backdrop for this discussion about individual rights, despite the fact that the arguments 
presented emphasize the language of rights rather than directly invoking the language of harm. 
 
(II) The Privacy Argument 
 There are many philosophical views regarding the importance of privacy. One view is that 
privacy is foundational to freedom more generally. Spinello argues that,  
there is an especially close relationship between privacy and freedom. It is quite difficult 
to exercise the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution when our actions are on display or 
when much of the intimate information about our lives is in the public domain. It is a 
struggle to make authentic choices when our evaluations, preferences, past history, and 
future objectives become widely known without our consent. (Spinello 1998: 727) 
Others highlight the significance of privacy as a mechanism for cultivating functional social 
relationships. In Privacy and Social Freedom, Schoeman highlights the importance of privacy as 
a mechanism for cultivating “associations and relational ties” between people (Schoeman 1992). 5 
The relationship between technological advancement and privacy has often been a fraught 
one.6 It seems that as the scope of technological capability increases, the scope of what can be kept 
 
5
 While this view of the value of privacy seems sound, it seems to me that it would be difficult or impossible to formulate a view of privacy 
rights that is animated by the priority of preserving and fostering valuable relationships. In the case of pornographic Deepfake content, it is 
understandable why one would argue that this content has harmed their relationships, and that it is therefore morally problematic. However, I do 
not see how one can extend this line of reasoning to the conclusion that their privacy rights have therefore been violated.  
6 Vold & Whittlestone argue that “because it is becoming easier for companies to use collected data for influence, threats to privacy are 
increasingly also threats to personal autonomy—an individual’s ability to reflect on and decide freely about their values, actions, and behaviour, 
and to act on those choices” (Vold & Whittlestone 2019: 3). We might accordingly say that privacy and autonomy are mutually reinforcing, and 
that technologization has the potential to erode both simultaneously. 
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private decreases.7 Consider the ubiquity of mobile applications such as Google Maps that enable 
application developers to record the movements of smartphone users through physical space.8 
While reasonable observers may disagree about whether these types of applications infringe users’ 
privacy rights, there is virtually no disagreement about the fact that the decision to use such 
applications does indeed result in diminished privacy.9 As services such as Google Maps have 
become staples of everyday life for an increasingly large segment of the world’s population, 
discussions about privacy have tended to focus on whether the loss of privacy that the services 
entail is problematic (and if so, just how problematic) rather than whether privacy is indeed being 
lost.10 The notion that using these services involves some sacrifice with regard to personal privacy 
is straightforward and uncontroversial.  
 This is not the case for Deepfake technology. Deepfake technology stands in contrast to 
other technologies such as web mapping services, as one may plausibly argue that the 
appropriation of a person’s likeness for the production of Deepfake content involves no loss of 
privacy for the targeted person.11 Assuming that the person’s likeness has already been publicized 
through some other means, Deepfake content producers need not reach into the private life of their 
target in order to retrieve data as a means of producing a final product that appears highly authentic. 
Thus the thought that Deepfake content does not involve a loss of privacy for those whose 
likenesses are used intuitively seems sound. Of course, if producers of Deepfake content are 
 
7
 Anderson points out that “[v]irtually all of the significant developments in the modern theory of privacy in the U.S. have in their very near 
vicinity a technological or social-organizational development to which they respond” (Anderson 2008: 101-102). Spinello warns that “If our 
privacy continues to evanesce in the wake of technology's unrelenting progress so too will our basic freedoms” (Spinello 1998: 727). 
8 An investigation by the Associated Press produced evidence that Google can and does continue recording location information about users even 
after they have turned off the “Location History” setting on the Google Maps app (Nakashima 2018). 
9
 Douglas notes that “[f]requently updated location information, such as stored by mobile devices that record their location, may reveal an 
individual’s daily routine, and so establish pattern knowledge about that individual” (Douglas 2016: 201). 
10
 My view is that having one’s location data collected constitutes a loss of privacy even if no human is examining this data directly.  
11
 In an 1890 Harvard Law Review article, Warren and Brandeis famously summarized the right to privacy as “the right to be let alone”. If this 
conceptualization of privacy is accepted, then producers of Deepfake content can plausibly argue that their work is consistent with “letting alone” 
the individuals whose likenesses are used, and thus has no impact on the privacy rights of these individuals. Of course, other conceptualizations 
of privacy are possible.  
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committing acts such as trespassing, stalking, or hacking in order to achieve their final product, 
this will clearly constitute a breach of the right to privacy. But the fact that Deepfake content 
production can theoretically take place in tandem with blatantly immoral and illegal acts cannot 
be used to demonstrate the illegitimacy of Deepfake content production itself. We must consider 
whether Deepfake content production can constitute an invasion of privacy in the absence of 
unambiguously invasive actions such as those mentioned above.12 
 A plausible argument for the view that Deepfake content production can constitute an 
invasion of privacy may appeal to the principle of personal impact.13 If Deepfake technology can 
be used to produce video content depicting an individual in a private situation that they would 
never consent to sharing with the public, and this video product is indistinguishable from an 
authentic video product, then the individual targeted by the Deepfake content may argue that the 
impact on them is also indistinguishable from an “authentic” act of privacy invasion. It is already 
the case that Deepfake technology is being used to produce pornographic content that exploits the 
likenesses of celebrities without their consent. Since the targeted celebrity did not agree to being 
filmed in sexually explicit scenarios and having this footage distributed to the public, at one point 
in time the only way for a content producer to obtain and distribute such footage would be to film 
this celebrity in sexually explicit scenarios without their consent,14 which obviously constitutes an 
 
12
 Many have noted the lack of a widely accepted definition of privacy, as well as the lack of a widely accepted philosophy of privacy rights, 
with Judith Thomson noting that “[p]erhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea 
what it is” (Thomson 1975: 295). Throughout this discussion I set aside the larger philosophical questions surrounding the nature of privacy 
rights, confining myself to considering how privacy rights can plausibly be appealed to in order to justify placing constraints on Deepfake 
technology.  
13
 I have chosen to use the language of “personal impact” here rather than the more familiar language of “victim impact” because I  want to avoid 
creating the impression that I am begging the question of whether an individual has in fact been victimized in this or that case involving Deepfake 
technology. If the question of whether victimization has in fact taken place is open to debate, then it is better to use the neutral language of 
“personal impact” in order to avoid confusion or (ostensible) circularity. (For a treatment of victim impact statements and their relationship to 
liberalism, see Rosebury 2011.) 
14
 Scenarios like this are not merely hypothetical. Terry Gene Bollea, professionally known as “Hulk Hogan”, was awarded $115,000,000 in 
compensatory damages after Gawker Media released a sexually explicit video of him that he maintains was recorded without his consent.  
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invasion of privacy. Virtually all observers would agree that this is an immoral and illegitimate 
act. 
From the perspective of the celebrity, the problem now is that technology exists that 
enables exploiters of celebrities to produce content that is indistinguishable15 from the genuine 
article without having to do the actual “work” of filming the celebrity in sexually explicit scenarios 
without their consent. The line of reasoning here is that while some steps have been bypassed, so 
to speak, in the process of exploiting celebrities via invasion of privacy, the actual impact on the 
targeted celebrity is no different than the impact generated by more conventional forms of privacy 
invasion. An individual may feel equally victimized by a pornographic Deepfake video of them 
produced without their consent as they would by an authentic pornographic video of them that had 
been produced without their consent. Since Deepfake content is (effectively) indistinguishable 
from authentic content from the perspective of consumers, it should be treated as such from the 
perspective of individual rights. The fact that the Deepfake content producers did not technically 
violate the privacy of their target is just that - a technicality.16 In these contexts, if privacy is to be 
conceptualized in a robust and substantive manner,17 then reasonable critics are bound to the 
conclusion that the celebrity’s right to privacy has indeed been violated. This is the Privacy 
Argument.18 
 
15 I do not wish to give the impression that all Deepfake content is highly convincing. However, it seems reasonable to predict that as this 
technology continues to improve and become more available, the proportion of Deepfake content that is highly convincing will increase. While 
technology is available that can be used to detect Deepfake content, the fact that Deepfake technology is rapidly evolving means that there is 
currently no stable, reliable method for detecting Deepfake content. In 2019, it was announced that Facebook would be sponsoring an event 
known as the Deepfake Detection Challenge in hopes of developing new tools for accurately identifying Deepfake content (Metz 2019). 
16
 In a lecture that is available for viewing online, journalist Samantha Cole makes the following statement, which seems to evoke this type of 
sentiment: “Targets of Deepfakes say that it does not matter intellectually that they know the images are fake. It feels like a violation. It feels like 
hundreds of people have seen them having sex on the Internet with a stranger. It feels real” (Cole 2020). 
17
 It is worth pointing out that the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade is founded on the positing of a right to privacy. In this case, it was 
determined that a ban on abortions is unconstitutional because it violates the right to privacy. If one finds the language of a “robust and 
substantive” conceptualization of privacy curious, the Roe v. Wade ruling may provide a glimpse of what such a conceptualization looks like in 
practice. 
18
 Of course, this argument is founded on the premise that individuals do indeed possess a right to privacy. Anderson outlines two main ways in 
which the right to privacy can be conceptualized. It can be conceptualized as protecting private individuals against the state, or it can be 
conceptualized as protecting private individuals from the state as well as other private actors. This discussion is informed by the latter 
conceptualization (Anderson 2008). 
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While this argument does have merits, I think that these merits are outweighed by some 
serious flaws. The biggest flaw relates to the amorphous character of the principle of personal 
impact. It is absolutely true that Deepfake content can impact targeted individuals in a way that 
causes them to feel that their privacy has been seriously compromised. But this is also true of other 
types of content. Many pieces of media can lead to sincere and acute feelings of one’s privacy 
being violated, and yet they are nonetheless viewed as legitimate forms of expression that do not 
entail a violation of anyone’s rights. Using personal impact as a criterion in order to determine 
whether invasion of privacy has taken place may render many forms of media vulnerable to the 
charge that they have violated the rights of particular individuals.19  
If a biopic20 is produced that is unflattering towards the person being biographied, then the 
person or their estate may have strong feelings about it that relate to the issue of privacy. Indeed, 
they might plausibly argue that the loss of privacy that they have experienced is greater than the 
loss of privacy experienced by those who have had their likenesses used in pornographic Deepfake 
content. While being the target of a pornographic Deepfake video may feel very invasive, a biopic 
that reveals intimate details of one’s life (related to personal relationships, physical and mental 
health, professional setbacks, etc.) may feel even more invasive. Indeed, feelings regarding 
invasiveness will likely vary greatly, as individuals are quite diverse. Every individual is unique 
 
19
 There is a significant gap between producing Deepfake content and publishing Deepfake content. One issue that remains open for debate is 
whether the Privacy Argument can be plausibly aimed at both of these forms of activity, or whether it ought to solely be concerned with 
Deepfake content that has been published in addition to being produced. A legal case in the Canadian province of Quebec known as Aubry v 
Éditions Vice-Versa Inc arrived at the conclusion that while a photographer does indeed have a right to photograph a person in a public space 
without consent from the subject, they do not have the right to publish this photograph without consent. It is interesting to consider whether this 
reasoning can plausibly be applied within the domain of Deepfake content. Granting that it is illegitimate to publish a pornographic Deepfake 
video depicting a celebrity without consent, is it also illegitimate to produce such content solely for the sake of one’s own personal use? This 
question merits further investigation. Sociologist Gary T. Marx explores this theme involving the scope of the private and the public in his book 
Windows into the Soul: Surveillance and Society in an Age of High Technology (specifically, a chapter titled “The Private within the Public: 
Psychological Report on Tom I. Voire”) (Marx 2016). 
20 The word “biopic” is an abbreviated combination of the words “biographical” and “picture”. The films A Beautiful Mind, Ray, and Milk are all 
examples of the biopic genre. 
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with regard to their personal boundaries and what they deem to be appropriate for publicization.21 
Some individuals may be horrified at the prospect of being the focus of an unflattering biopic, but 
be relatively unbothered by the prospect of being the target of a pornographic Deepfake video. Of 
course, the reverse could also be true. 
The upshot is that if we accept the principle of personal impact, and use it to formulate a 
litmus test that aims to determine whether privacy rights have been violated, the outcomes could 
be far too inclusive, and lay the groundwork for the censorship of many types of content that are 
(rightfully, in my view) conceptualized as legitimate forms of expression. While I have chosen the 
example of biopics for this discussion, we can easily imagine many documentarians, journalists, 
satirists, comedians, and so on, being accused of privacy violations in a world wherein personal 
impact is used as the unit of measurement that determines whether a privacy rights violation has 
occurred. Indeed, a great deal of art is revered precisely because it communicates information and 
insights that certain individuals (particularly powerful individuals) would prefer to keep quiet. If 
the Privacy Argument is accepted, we may find that it legitimizes censorship towards a wide 
variety of media as collateral damage, so to speak.22 
It is important to emphasize that my conclusion regarding the Privacy Argument and the 
principle of personal impact in no way dismisses the fact that individuals may be genuinely 
aggrieved by Deepfake content. To the contrary, the potentially offensive character of Deepfake 
content is part of what motivates my discussion in the first place. However, individuals living in 
pluralistic societies are caused offense by innumerable things. Some individuals are offended by 
interpretations of a religious text that rival their own interpretation, and sometimes these 
 
21
 Spinello notes: “...privacy lacks the simplicity of other collective goods or values since it affects so many areas of our lives in different ways 
and since personal preferences about privacy vary so widely. Some people simply do prefer more of it than others” (Spinello 1998: 730). 
22
 McCloskey raises a concern that is effectively the mirror image of this one. His concern is that linking the concept of privacy to “emotional 
reactions” may be underinclusive, as individuals living under totalitarian regimes may be conditioned to tolerate and accept violations of their 
privacy that ought to be resisted (McCloskey 1980: 28). 
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differences in interpretation can generate so much animosity that they lead to physical violence. 
Regardless, it is generally agreed upon by those with a liberal orientation that an interpretation of 
a religious text cannot legitimately be censored on the grounds that it causes offense to those who 
disagree with it.23 I subscribe to the view that proving that an individual has been offended by a 
form of expression is not equivalent to proving that an individual has been harmed by a form of 
expression.24 This view does not preclude the possibility of expression sometimes entailing 
genuine harm towards individuals. If it turns out to be the case that a certain form of expression, 
such as a biopic, has functioned to damage the reputation of its subject in a manner that is 
undeserved and unwarranted, then this will provide grounds for the charge that this biopic has 
served to violate the rights of its subject. However, this charge brings us outside of the domain of 
privacy violations and into the domain of defamation. This domain is the focal point of the 
following section of my discussion. 
 
(III) The Defamation Argument 
 Another line of argument with regard to the relationship between Deepfake technology and 
individual rights revolves around the concept of defamation. Defamation is generally well 
understood as a concept, and most, if not all, proponents of free expression view this concept as 
legitimate. While it is true that individuals have the right to express themselves freely without fear 
of (legal) punishment, it is also true that people at times abuse this right in order to damage the 
reputations and livelihoods of others. When such abuses take place, it is legitimate to punish those 
 
23
 Feinberg advances the view that while there is a distinction between harm and offense (with harm being greater in severity), some forms of 
offense are great enough to warrant prohibition. Feinberg thus offers an “offense principle” to complement the Millian harm principle. While I do 
not accept Feinbeg’s view, it would be interesting to examine the relationship between Deepfake technology and the offense pr inciple (Feinberg 
1985). 
24
 My position is largely informed by arguments advanced by L.W. Sumner in his book The Hateful and the Obscene. Sumner argues in favour 
of the view that censorship can only be justified (i.e. legitimate) if and when it can be demonstrated that a form of expression produces harm. 
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guilty of committing acts of defamation; this punishment does not constitute a violation of one’s 
right to free expression.25 Importantly, when an agent (whether this agent be an individual or a 
group) is charged with committing an act of defamation, the debate surrounding whether 
defamation has taken place will generally emphasize the issue of impact rather than the issue of 
intent. While intent can be taken into consideration when assessing charges of defamation, 
ultimately one can be guilty of defamation regardless of whether their intent is malicious, noble, 
or neutral. What is of primary interest is whether the words and ideas propagated by the agent have 
served to damage the reputation of another in a manner that is illegitimate.26 
 In certain contexts, misbehaviour involving Deepfake content will fit fairly snugly into the 
conceptual schemes that have been established with regard to defamation, which subsumes the 
categories of slander and libel. If a media outlet circulates a Deepfake video of a prominent 
individual committing a heinous crime and claims that the video is authentic, it is plain to see that 
this constitutes libel, and that the rights of the individual in question have been violated. It is also 
plausible to advance the supplementary claim that since Deepfake content appears authentic in a 
manner that is distinct from printed content (or other types of media), it constitutes an especially 
grave form of libel, and therefore an especially serious rights violation. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that defaming someone through video and audio that have been manipulated by Artificial 
Intelligence is more egregious than defaming someone through printed or spoken words, while 
maintaining that both are unacceptable.  
 
25
 Peonidis pithily articulates this point: “It is intuitively evident that in certain contexts defamatory speech can have dire consequences no liberal 
can condone” (Peonidis 1998: 8). 
26
 An implication here is that oftentimes damaging one’s reputation is indeed legitimate. A news outlet can cause damage to the reputations (and 
livelihoods) of many individuals without ever engaging in conduct that is defamatory, so long as the damaging information they publish is 
correct. 
11 
 In other contexts, the Defamation Argument may run into problems. Consider again the 
example of pornographic Deepfake content that exploits the likenesses of celebrities.27 Does it 
make good sense to view this sort of content as a form of defamation? There are a handful of ways 
in which producers of this content can attempt to sidestep the accusation that they have defamed a 
celebrity. The manner in which the content is presented is significant. Deepfake content can be 
presented in a manner wherein consumers are explicitly informed that their senses are going to be 
deceived. The realism of Deepfake content need not be accompanied by the idea that consumers 
of this content ought to think that it is authentic. Just as producers of video games can use the 
realism of these games as a selling point, while preserving the clear understanding between 
producer and consumer that the events taking place on screen28 are fictitious, a producer of 
Deepfake content can cultivate a similar understanding. Deepfake content can feature disclaimers 
that explicitly highlight the lack of authenticity of the events taking place on screen. It may be the 
case that disclaimers like these actually do alleviate a great deal of concern about defamation. It is 
plausible to think that targeted individuals, and those who are sympathetic towards them and care 
about their rights, might be significantly less bothered by pornographic Deepfake content if it 
includes such disclaimers. Even if they dislike the content and would prefer for it to not exist, they 
may reasonably conclude that the inclusion of disclaimers exempts it from being legitimately 
labeled as “defamatory.” Perhaps the issue is as simple is that. 
However, I suspect that for many targeted individuals, as well as those who are concerned 
about their rights, such disclaimers will offer cold comfort. For one thing, not all consumers of 
 
27 Soble points out that some philosophers, such as Helen Longino, have argued for censorship of pornography on the grounds that it is 
defamatory towards women. Soble rejects this view, arguing that pornography is “nonpropositional” and therefore not defamatory. It is 
interesting to consider how the specific example of pornographic Deepfake content might complicate Soble’s view about the nonpropositional 
character of pornography (Soble 1985). 
28
 It is worth noting that while Deepfake content often includes both video and audio components, it can consist of video only, as well as audio 
only. While I do not specifically address audio-only Deepfake content in this paper, my hope is that the arguments presented apply to it in the 
same way that they apply to other Deepfake content.  
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media are equally literate, and it remains plausible to think that in some cases, consumers will be 
deceived into thinking that Deepfake content is authentic even when explicit disclaimers are 
included. It is reasonable to expect that even when a person is shown a Deepfake video of a 
prominent individual committing a heinous act, and is informed that the video is inauthentic, the 
Deepfake content nonetheless collides with their psychology in a way that damages their 
perception of the individual. It is possible for misinformation to shape individuals’ beliefs even in 
cases wherein they are explicitly informed that a specific piece of content they have been exposed 
to involves misinformation.  
While I am not aware of psychological experiments that involve Deepfake content 
specifically, the outcomes of experiments involving ordinary video content and print content 
suggest that misinformation involving Deepfake content can be an especially potent tool for 
influencing doxastic attitudes.29 Literature indicates that when people are exposed to 
misinformation, it is difficult to correct the resulting misbelief. Some strategies for correcting 
misinformation are more effective than others: issuing a correction before a person is exposed to 
misinformation appears to be more productive than issuing one after exposure has already taken 
place. One finding that is particularly concerning is that in some instances, efforts to correct 
misbelief can actually generate increased misbelief.30 While we should look forward to thorough 
psychological research involving Deepfake content that can assist decision-making in this area, it 
is clear for the time being that the correction of misinformation is far from being a straightforward 
matter. While the inclusion of declaimers on Deepfake content may be helpful in some cases, this 
strategy is by no means a panacea.  
 
29
 By “ordinary video content,” I simply mean video content that does not involve deployment of Deepfake technology.  




Another major concern that I wish to raise with regard to the Defamation Argument has to 
do with the fact that people disagree dramatically about which types of words, images, and ideas 
are defamatory; the character of defamation is highly indeterminate. This sort of disagreement can 
be especially pernicious in the context of discussions about Deepfake content and its relationship 
to individual rights. The concept of defamation ultimately boils down to damage inflicted towards 
one’s reputation.31 But what constitutes such damage can depend to a large extent on the position 
that the relevant individual occupies within society, as well as the specific features of this 
individual. We can probably all agree that a Deepfake video of a person drinking a glass of water 
lacks the potential to inflict damage towards one’s reputation. In addition, we can probably all 
agree that a Deepfake video of a person abusing someone with a disability does possess the 
potential to damage their reputation. But there are other cases we might encounter wherein 
agreement may be difficult to obtain, and determining a common benchmark that can be used as a 
mechanism for bridging disagreement will be a fraught endeavour. 
Consider the example of a Deepfake video that depicts a real person eating beef. To many, 
this video will clearly lack any sort of defamatory character, as eating beef is considered to be a 
normal human behaviour that is in no way objectionable. However, members of a specific religious 
community wherein beef consumption is considered sinful could perceive this video content as 
being quite scandalous. In cases such as this one, wherein (potential) damage to one’s reputation 
is confined to a specific religious community, how should we go about determining whether an act 
of defamation has taken place? Does the damage inflicted to an individual’s reputation need to be 
 
31
 In his discussion of doxing, Douglas outlines a tripartite taxonomy of doxing. He calls the three types of doxing “deanonymizing,” “targeting,” 
and “delegitimizing”. The last of the three types is defined as doxing that “reveals intimate personal information that damages the credibility of 
that individual” (Douglas 2016: 199). Since doxing itself is defined by Douglas as “the intentional public release onto the Internet of personal 
information about an individual by a third party, often with the intent to humiliate, threaten, intimidate, or punish the identified individual,” it 
may be worthwhile to ask whether certain deployments of Deepfake technology, such as the example involving pornographic depictions of 
celebrities, actually amount to a form of doxing. Douglas specifically cites “involuntary pornography” as an example of delegitimizing doxing, so 
perhaps it can be argued that pornographic Deepfake content ought to be subsumed under this category. 
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broad, i.e. impacting the way in which they are generally perceived by society? Or can the damage 
be more narrow, involving only specific segments of society?32  
If the latter view is accepted, then we will need to develop an account that can answer yet 
another question: how narrow is too narrow? While charges of defamation arising from the case I 
have sketched involving beef consumption may indeed be legitimate, it seems that there are other 
cases we can imagine (say, wherein a Deepfake video creates a false and embarrassing impression 
of someone’s taste in music) that are just too frivolous to be conceptualized as acts of defamation. 
Of course, my point here is not to offer an answer regarding which types of Deepfake content are 
in fact defamatory and which are not. My point is simply that people can and do disagree 
significantly about what can constitute defamation, and therefore the Defamation Argument carries 
with it a large philosophical burden. It must be able to handle borderline cases in addition to 
straightforward cases. This philosophical burden applies to the philosophy of defamation more 
generally and is not unique to cases involving Deepfake technology. The upshot is that if one is 
going to endorse the view that Deepfake content can indeed violate the rights of individuals by 
having a defamatory character, they will not be immune from these concerns regarding the nature 
of defamation and its inherent indeterminacy. 
I anticipate that some will be unconvinced by my criticisms of the Defamation Argument 
on the grounds that defamation law already exists in the real world, and that it already does a 
satisfactory job of contending with borderline cases. The sensibility here might be that Deepfake 
content is just one more venue for defamation on a list of venues that is already long, and that I 
have exaggerated the significance of borderline cases. There may be merit to this perspective. 
 
32
 Peonidis nicely summarizes this point: “...one’s conception of defamation is directly dependent on the moral standards that prevail in a specific 
society, since a person of good reputation is someone who exemplifies certain commonly recognised moral qualities. But even within this 
particularised context there is room for disagreement as to what constitutes defamation” (Peonidis 1998: 5). 
15 
However, I would encourage advocates of this view to bear in mind the considerable degree of 
heterogeneity that exists with respect to defamation law in various jurisdictions. If one is going to 
argue that “the law” is already good at handling defamation cases, I will ask which law in which 
jurisdiction they have in mind. No jurisdiction has a strategy for dealing with defamation cases 
that is widely agreed to be the most sound. I will leave it to experts on defamation to make the 
case that existing statutes are already well equipped to handle cases involving Deepfake content, 
including borderline cases. I remain skeptical that this is the case.  
To be clear: the Defamation Argument is far from useless. This argument will be very 
compelling in the context of a relatively narrow set of cases involving Deepfake technology. There 
will be deployments of Deepfake technology that are plainly dishonest and malicious, and that are 
designed to victimize a specific person or group. In such cases, it will be straightforward to see 
that this content is defamatory. However, it seems that this sort of content will only comprise a 
relatively small portion of the Deepfake content that is published and circulated in the modern 
media landscape. While the Defamation Argument will be useful for determining the illegitimacy 
of Deepfake content that falls into this category, there are many other cases wherein it will struggle 
to arrive at a clear conclusion about whether a specific act involving Deepfake technology is 
legitimate. The purpose of this discussion is to identify a reliable framework that can be deployed 
to assess the legitimacy of Deepfake content in many diverse cases, and not merely in the context 
of a handful of exceptionally egregious cases. I am searching for a framework that can be applied 
to content that is malicious, content that is benevolent, and everything in between. This includes 
Deepfake content that is circulated on obscure online message boards that will only be consumed 
by a few, as well as Deepfake content published by major Hollywood movie studios that will be 
consumed by millions. Importantly, due to the fact that this technology is still evolving with respect 
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to its sophistication and availability, it is important to identify a framework that can accommodate 
uses of Deepfake technology that we can scarcely imagine, due to the fact that they have not yet 
taken place. I think that there is an approach to assessing the legitimacy of Deepfake content that 
is simpler, cleaner, more elegant, and more reliable than the approach offered by the Defamation 
Argument. This brings us to my discussion of the Property Argument.  
 
(IV) The Property Argument 
 The third and final view regarding the relationship between Deepfake technology and 
individual rights that I wish to consider focuses on property rights. This line of reasoning is based 
on the foundational premise that individuals own their likenesses as a form of private property.33 
It is for this reason that certain types of Deepfake content can entail a violation of individuals’ 
rights.34 Let us return to the example of pornographic Deepfake content that exploits the likenesses 
of celebrities without their consent. Within the framework of the Property Argument, the Deepfake 
content in question constitutes a violation of the targeted celebrity’s rights because it effectively 
amounts to a form of theft.35 While individuals (famous or otherwise) can grant permission to 
Deepfake content producers to use their likenesses for a project, the producers of the content cannot 
 
33
 While the issue of ownership of one’s body has received attention in philosophy literature, the issue of whether “ownership of one’s body” 
necessarily entails “ownership of one’s likeness” does not seem to arise in said literature. Discussions of ownership of one’s physical body (and 
its parts) are offered by Wheeler (Wheeler 1980), Spinello (Spinello 2004) and Björkman & Hansson (Björkman & Hansson 2006). I do not think 
that the arguments offered by these authors bind them to a specific conclusion with regard to the likeness question. Spinello takes on the issue of 
property rights in genetic information, and highlights a principle known as “genetic exceptionalism, which asserts that genetic information needs 
a higher level of protection than other kinds of personal information such as financial data” (Spinello 2004: 29). A point worth considering is 
whether an individual’s likeness ought to be included in the category of “genetic information.” 
34
 Cwik offers a helpful breakdown of key terms involved in the philosophy of intellectual property: “The term “intellectual property” (or “IP”) is 
a blanket term for a number of legal entitlements, which are collectively referred to as “intellectual property rights” (or “IPRs”). The most 
familiar of these are patent and copyright; also included in the category are trademark and trade secret protections. Sometimes more exotic legal 
entitlements (either existing or proposed) such as rights over use of one’s public image or likeness, so-called “information rights” (rights to keep 
certain information, like medical records, private) and the somewhat misleadingly titled “moral rights” of creators of artistic and literary works 
(to, among other things, attribution as creator of a work) are also grouped with patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets as IPRs” (Cwik 
2016: 471). 
35
 Karlen explores the relationship between property rights and aesthetic creations. Since copyright is intertwined with authorship, perhaps one 
could argue that an individual’s likeness ought to be conceptualized as an aesthetic creation that they have authored, and therefore have rightful 
ownership of. While the relationship between a person’s likeness and their own powers of authorship is by no means clear and direct, it might 
provide a fruitful avenue for inquiry (Karlen 1986). 
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unilaterally decide to include the likenesses of other real people in their content; doing so lacks 
legitimacy.36 An agreement, which may involve financial compensation, must be reached in order 
for the project to be legitimate.37 
 An advantage of the Property Argument is its conceptual simplicity. I view it as being fairly 
neat and elegant in comparison to the Privacy Argument and the Defamation Argument. We 
generally have a good intuitive understanding of the idea that getting something from someone 
with permission is legitimate, but taking something from them without permission is illegitimate.38 
Inserting personal likenesses into this framework seems like a promising avenue for identifying 
cases wherein Deepfake technology is being used in a manner that violates the rights of an 
individual.39 Some may be skeptical of the notion that individuals can have legal ownership over 
their own likeness. Surely ownership of a likeness is unlike ownership of other things, such as 
physical inanimate objects, in some meaningful way. It is fair to suggest that ownership of 
likenesses is less straightforward than these more mundane cases of ownership. However, my view 
is that an individual owning their own likeness as a form of private property is not fundamentally 
different from other forms of intellectual property ownership.  
 
36
 Spinello compellingly argues that rights afforded to famous individuals over uses of their likenesses should be extended to all individuals: “... 
the Courts have traditionally protected famous individuals from having their names or photos used against their will, e.g., to make unauthorized 
product endorsements. They recognize a property right in these names and photographic images. Why shouldn't a property right also be extended 
to everyone's digital persona (or image) since it too can be used for commercial purposes without authorization?” (Spinello 1998: 734) Of course, 
with regard to the issue of Deepfake content, I would extend the reasoning further still to include all appropriations of likenesses, even ones that 
are not being used for commercial purposes. 
37 It is interesting to consider how the Property Argument intersects with the broader debate surrounding data collection and ownership. Since 
digital data collection is now an immensely lucrative practice, some prominent individuals, including 2020 US Democratic presidential candidate 
Andrew Yang, have publicly argued that Internet users are entitled to a share of the earnings generated from their data. 
38
 McCloskey considers the view that privacy rights actually fall under the umbrella of property rights. Within this paradigm, to have a right to 
privacy is to own one’s privacy as a form of private property. McCloskey rejects the paradigm on the grounds that it leaves open the possibility of 
individuals consensually buying and selling privacy in a manner that nonetheless constitutes an invasion of privacy. He states: “payment in full of 
the price demanded is still compatible with gross invasion of privacy, that compensation by way of payment of damages, no matter how great the 
payment, may be no more real compensation for lack of respect for privacy than is financial compensation for loss of sight or limbs” (McCloskey 
1980: 27). 
39
 Perhaps one could invoke Locke in order to construct an argument that since individuals do not produce their likenesses through their own 
labour, it is not legitimate for one to claim their likeness as a form of private property. I am inclined to think that it is plausible to argue that the 
likenesses of individuals are indeed mixed with their labour since all individuals exert at least some control over their physical appearance. For a 
discussion of the relationship between intellectual property rights and the deployment of labour see Cwik 2014. 
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Intellectual property is an integral component of economies around the world, and even 
though there is room for disagreement about where intellectual property rights begin and end, it is 
generally accepted that people and groups can have legitimate ownership over abstract (i.e. non-
physical) entities. People can and do have property rights over abstract entities such as fictional 
characters, and in some cases they are willing to pay vast sums of money in order to take on 
ownership of these entities.40 If it is reasonable for people to have ownership over the likenesses 
of fictional characters, then it must be equally reasonable, if not more reasonable, for them to have 
ownership over their own likeness. After all, fictional characters do not have the ability to become 
emotionally invested in how their likenesses are used, and there is no reason to worry about 
whether use of a fictional character’s likeness will damage their reputation or livelihood. 
Meanwhile, actual human beings can easily have their reputation and livelihood damaged if their 
likeness is used in a manner that is irresponsible or malicious. Such acts can inflict significant 
suffering upon them. In this sense, ownership of the likenesses of fictional characters is a trivial 
matter in comparison to ownership of the likeness of a real person. It accordingly makes good 
sense for us to establish a robust framework that is concerned with how use of people’s likenesses 
is to be governed. My view is that inserting likenesses into a property rights framework is a 
promising avenue for ensuring that likenesses are not deployed in a manner that is irresponsible or 
malicious. 
The Property Argument does have some features that not all may view as desirable that 
merit explication. One very significant aspect of this argument is that the specific events being 
depicted in Deepfake content have no bearing on the force of the argument. I have used the 
 
40 The Walt Disney Company made the decision to purchase Marvel Entertainment for $4,000,000,000 in 2009, presumably because it reasoned 
that having the rights to produce and sell content invoking the likenesses of fictional characters such as “Spider-Man,” “The Incredible Hulk,” 
and “Iron Man” would be well worth the investment. It is clear that the commodification and exchange of likenesses is something that can and 
does take place in the real world – sometimes on a scale involving astronomical sums of money. 
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example of pornographic Deepfake content featuring the likenesses of celebrities throughout this 
discussion for two reasons: One is that this example has already manifested itself in the real world 
and generated controversy; it is not merely hypothetical. The other is that this example makes it 
quite easy to see how and why a person could reasonably find Deepfake content objectionable. If 
Deepfake technology were only being used for unambiguously innocent or noble purposes, then 
we might be inclined to view this entire discussion about individual rights as moot. The example 
involving pornographic depictions of celebrities makes it abundantly clear that some applications 
of Deepfake technology may be more nefarious than others. 
 I make this point because the Property Argument is, in essence, completely indifferent 
towards the types of events being depicted in Deepfake content. Whether the Deepfake content 
depicts an individual committing a heinous crime, or whether it merely depicts them performing 
some mundane act, it cannot evade the scope of the Property Argument. Within this framework, 
appropriating the likeness of a person is illegitimate if consent from the person is not provided, 
and this illegitimacy stands regardless of whether the events depicted in the Deepfake content are 
good or bad or neutral. Some may view this as a defect of the Property Argument, but I am inclined 
to view it as a desirable feature. This simplicity enables us to avoid burdensome philosophical 
questions regarding personal impact, and whether this or that depiction is sufficiently damaging in 
order to constitute a rights violation. This relative parsimony is a virtue of the Property Argument. 
 In the preceding section, I noted that there will be deployments of Deepfake technology 
that clearly constitute defamation. One may plausibly wonder how I can admit this point, yet still 
defend the conclusion that the Property Argument offers a superior approach to the regulation of 
Deepfake content than the Defamation Argument. The answer is simply that the Property 
Argument has a much greater scope than the Defamation Argument. While it is true that the 
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Defamation Argument can be just as powerful as the Property Argument in identifying illegitimate 
deployments of Deepfake technology in some cases, it is much less powerful when we take a more 
general view of Deepfake content. Let us suppose that we want to inquire about the 
legitimacy/illegitimacy of all of the Deepfake content that exists. If we adopt the Defamation 
Argument, we will need to make distinctions between various types of content based on how 
threatening they are to the reputation and livelihood of the person whose likeness is used in the 
content. A plausible classificatory scheme that seeks to organize all of the Deepfake content that 
exists may invoke the following five categories: 1.) Clearly Defamatory 2.) Probably Defamatory 
3.) Possibly Defamatory 4.) Probably Not Defamatory 5.) Clearly Not Defamatory. While the 
Defamation Argument can easily produce conclusions regarding prohibition of content that falls 
into Category 1, for every other category its power to regulate content is either limited or 
nonexistent. Even though there may be very good reasons to be concerned about content that falls 
into categories 2 through 5, the Defamation Argument will be ill-equipped to produce actionable 
prescriptions regarding the prohibition of this content. 
 In order to illustrate the limitations of the Defamation Argument in comparison to the 
Property Argument, let us once again consider the example of pornographic Deepfake content that 
exploits the likenesses of celebrities. More specifically: let us imagine that a Deepfake video has 
been published online that depicts a celebrity engaging in consensual sexual activities with their 
real-life spouse, and that these activities include nothing out of the ordinary. Of the five categories 
listed above, which category does this content belong in? I find it difficult to produce a confident 
answer here. I can imagine plausible arguments being offered about why this content belongs in 
each of the categories I have enumerated. There is nothing controversial about a celebrity engaging 
in consensual sexual relations with their spouse, and therefore one may argue that this content 
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belongs in Category 5. Meanwhile, the targeted celebrity may plausibly argue that the content 
belongs in Category 1 since it depicts them in a manner that they would never be comfortable 
sharing with the public, and that they believe has compromised their public perception and image. 
If we adopt the Defamation Argument and use it to establish a framework for the regulation of 
Deepfake content, then these types of debates can continue indefinitely. 
 Alternatively, the Property Argument can entirely sidestep these sorts of complicated and 
taxing debates. In order to invoke the Property Argument, we need to ask exactly one question: 
did the Deepfake content in question use a person’s likeness without their consent? If the answer 
is yes, then we have grounds to disallow this content. The five categories identified above are all 
fair game for this argument to an equal extent. It is worthwhile to clarify the conclusion that these 
observations lead toward. Even though the Defamation Argument can provide an equally strong 
case for placing limits upon Deepfake content in a relatively narrow set of cases, in general, the 
Property Argument offers a clearer and more robust mechanism for arriving at conclusions about 
the legitimacy and illegitimacy of Deepfake content. This paper is interested in identifying an 
approach to Deepfake technology and individual rights that is useful in a broad variety of cases, 
and not just in some exceptionally clear-cut cases, and that is why I defend the conclusion that the 
Property Argument is superior to the Defamation Argument, as well as the Privacy Argument.  
 A reasonable question to ask at this point is whether the Property Argument forbids 
practices that are ubiquitous and widely viewed as legitimate. When a person does something that 
is newsworthy, it is usually the case that news outlets proceed to publish the likeness of this person 
without ever requesting permission. This seems like an unproblematic practice that would fall 
afoul of the Property Argument, and this may be used as a rationale for rejecting the argument. I 
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think that the Property Argument can be defended from this sort of challenge, and I will identify a 
strategy for achieving this. 
 The Property Argument can be protected from this challenge by introducing a public 
interest criterion that functions as a check on the argument. This public interest criterion will hold 
that exceptions can be made within the context of the Property Argument if and when it is 
determined that publishing the likeness of a person who has not granted consent is vital to the 
public interest. An uncontroversial example will involve a known assailant who has not yet been 
apprehended by authorities. It is intuitive and sound to suggest that it is legitimate for media outlets 
to circulate the likeness of this person without their consent, due to the fact that it is in the public’s 
interest to be familiar with the appearance of this person for the sake of safety. The reasoning here 
will maintain that while this assailant does indeed possess a property right with respect to their 
likeness, it is acceptable for other parties to override this right when doing so fulfills a vital public 
interest. Publishing the appearance of this person is accordingly a limitation on the relevant 
property right rather than a violation of the right.41  
This is a view that should be wholly inoffensive to most, and this includes committed 
liberals. Even the staunchest defenders of individual rights generally admit that rights are not 
absolute, and that certain limits can be placed on these rights. The right to free expression does not 
entitle one to falsely report a bomb threat at a crowded airport. The right to privacy does not entitle 
one to enjoy solitude in their apartment unit when authorities have reason to think that they are 
conducting a methamphetamine operation that could cause fires and explosions that will jeopardize 
 
41
 Note that while ownership over likenesses is already commonplace in the world of intellectual property, this type of ownership comes with 
certain limitations. In US copyright law, the “fair use” doctrine empowers individuals and groups who do not have ownership over a piece of 
intellectual property to make use of it without first obtaining permission from the relevant right holder. While there is room for disagreement over 
what exactly qualifies as fair use, the doctrine is successfully invoked on a routine basis. An implication is that even after paying billions of 
dollars for the right to use the likenesses of certain fictional characters, powerful companies such as the Walt Disney Company must accept that 
others will continue to use these likenesses so long as they adhere to rules regarding fair use. 
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the lives of others living in the same apartment complex. Likewise, a property right over one’s 
own likeness does not entitle one to inflict harms on others without having this property right 
limited so that these harms can be mitigated. To a certain extent, a liberal framework presupposes 
that individual rights can be limited when they come into conflict with the rights of others, and it 
should not be surprising or bothersome that property rights over likenesses involve certain 
qualifications and limitations. 
 It is also worth noting that no feature of the Property Argument necessarily precludes 
individuals from opting out of private ownership over their likeness. We can easily imagine a 
service being provided that enables individuals to declare publicly whether or not they consent to 
their likeness being used by others without direct, explicit permission. This could streamline the 
permission acquisition process and reduce the frequency with which parties must communicate 
directly with individuals in order to obtain consent to employ their likeness. Like any other 
property right, a property right over one’s likeness can be waived or forfeited. 
 This discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Property Argument is far from 
exhaustive. Given the level of sophistication of Deepfake technology, and the variety of ways in 
which it may be used, there is no shortage of possible cases involving the technology that are 
philosophically interesting from the standpoint of individual rights.42 Perhaps there are cases that 
I have not yet considered that will present serious challenges for this argument.43 The overarching 
question that animates this discussion is whether there are compelling arguments in favour of 
 
42
 As was noted earlier, the case of Aubry v Éditions Vice-Versa Inc in Quebec highlights the distinction between producing and publishing a 
photograph of an individual without their consent. This distinction between producing and publishing seems like it also is relevant within the 
context of the Property Argument. Is it legitimate to appropriate another’s likeness without permission for the sake of producing Deepfake 
content that is intended solely for individual personal use? It seems that the Property Argument could be formulated in order to answer this 
question in the negative or the affirmative. I will not attempt to answer this question here. 
43
 One issue that will need to be addressed involves different individuals who are physically identical, or near-identical. We can imagine a case 
involving identical twins, wherein one consents to their likeness being used in Deepfake content while the other abstains from granting consent. 
Has the former twin here violated the rights of the latter? I am inclined to think that this would not amount to a formal, substantive violation of 
the twin’s rights, and that we will need to bite the proverbial bullet and accept that the property argument cannot shield all individuals from 
deployments of Deepfake content that are offensive and/or morally dubious.  
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constraining the deployment of Deepfake technology on the grounds that its use violates the rights 
of individuals. Currently, my view is that the Property Argument lays out the most robust and 
reliable strategy for legitimately constraining Deepfake content in the interest of protecting 
individual rights.  
It is worth pointing out that property rights are an integral component of the classical liberal 
tradition,44 as is the right to free expression. This is significant because concerns about illiberalism 
can be advanced by individuals on both sides of the broader debate about Deepfake technology 
and whether it can be legitimately constrained. Individuals who think that the production and 
distribution of Deepfake content should be completely unrestricted can argue that those on the 
opposing side of the debate are insufficiently committed to the right to free expression. Meanwhile, 
those who endorse the Property Argument and accordingly think that placing constraints on 
Deepfake content can be legitimate, can argue that their opponents are insufficiently committed to 
property rights. It is not obvious which orientation is more faithfully aligned with the liberal 
tradition. Deepfake technology thus presents an opportunity for an exceptionally interesting case 
study in applications of liberal philosophy and theory more generally. My hope is that a richer 
literature on the subject is on the horizon. 
 
(V) Marketplace Solutions 
I wish to supplement my discussion of Deepfake technology and individual rights by 
briefly acknowledging that there are strategies for addressing problematic uses of Deepfake 
technology that do not necessarily implicate rights (or rights theory). Let us consider once again 
 
44
 Interestingly, in this regard, property rights stand in especially stark contrast to privacy rights. McCloskey notes that major classical liberal 
thinkers such as Locke and Mill do not take on the issue of privacy rights in their writings. He argues that contemporary notions about the right to 
privacy have their roots in the American legal profession rather than the work of philosophers (McCloskey 1980). 
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the example of pornographic Deepfake content that exploits the likenesses of celebrities without 
their consent. Issues of rights aside, it may simply turn out to be the case that consumers arrive at 
a consensus that this type of content is morally unacceptable, and that any person or company 
involved in the production or distribution of such content will pay a high cost as a result. It may 
be public backlash, rather than charges of rights violations, that proves most efficacious with 
regard to regulating the use of Deepfake technology. In 2018, the website Reddit shut down an 
online community dedicated to pornographic Deepfake content that had existed on its platform, 
suggesting that private companies may be able and willing to regulate this content in a manner that 
is satisfactory to those who are concerned about it. 
Indeed, a number of the world’s most popular online platforms have stated that 
pornographic Deepfake content that appropriates celebrity likenesses violates their rules 
prohibiting non-consensual (or involuntary) pornography, and accordingly will work to remove 
this type of content if it is detected on their platform (Cole 2018). This development seems like an 
important step in the right direction. However, this development should not be taken as an 
indication that such content is on its way to being purged from the marketplace, as it remains 
entirely possible that a niche market will emerge that can remain profitable without cooperation 
from these large digital media platforms. Perhaps the market for Deepfake pornography featuring 
celebrity likenesses will run parallel to the mainstream pornography market and the two will 
remain separate. It remains possible that producers will be able to profit significantly from a small 
number of consumers who are willing to pay high prices for pornographic content including the 
likeness of their preferred celebrity. The upshot is that even if every mainstream digital media 
platform agrees that this type of Deepfake content is unacceptable, this does not guarantee that this 
content will not be readily available to those who want to access and purchase it. 
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It is of course also worth noting that one of the most prominent fears regarding Deepfake 
technology concerns its application in political propaganda and disinformation campaigns.45 This 
topic is far too rich to treat in detail here. However, it is worth taking a moment to consider whether 
the marketplace will have an answer for this very legitimate concern. It seems to me that in most 
cases, a major media outlet that commits the act of distributing such content to the public in a 
manner that misinforms46 it will accordingly suffer a very severe loss of credibility. This loss of 
credibility may prove damaging or even fatal to their fiscal bottom line. Credibility is an important 
form of currency in the media landscape. While a great deal could be said about journalistic failures 
that have been committed by large media outlets that have continued to operate, my general view 
is that there are journalistic failures so egregious that they can spell the demise of an institution. I 
expect that perpetuating falsehoods through Deepfake content would constitute one such 
journalistic failure. Perhaps media outlets will be so protective of their credibility in the wake of 
widespread dissemination of Deepfake content that it will actually help raise the proverbial bar in 
the world of journalism, and lead to greater vigilance in separating fact from fiction. 
While there is room for some optimism in this debate, we must also recognize the 
possibility that the news media marketplace will operate in a manner analogous to the one outlined 
above involving a niche market for pornographic content involving celebrity likenesses. While 
news outlets that conform to journalistic norms involving fact-checking and error correction will 
tread carefully with respect to Deepfake content in order to protect their credibility, there will 
 
45
 A potentially surprising aspect of applications of Deepfake technology that are politically motivated is that these applications can be argued to 
have an especially strong claim to legitimacy as forms of expression, in comparison to other types of content employing Deepfake technology. A 
precedent for this view can be found in the United States. The US Supreme Court has undertaken the project of distinguishing between various 
categories of speech, and has concluded that some categories (such as political speech) enjoy more robust First Amendment protections than 
other categories (such as commercial speech). Accordingly, if some Deepfake content is determined to fall under the umbrella of “political 
speech,” then this content will actually be more difficult to constrain (at least in the US context) than other types, such as pornographic content. 
For a more detailed discussion of speech categories and their First Amendment protections, see Sumner 2004. 
46
 Misinformation through social media has received philosophical treatment from Millar (Millar 2019), Obadă (Obadă 2019) and Pepp, 
Michaelson, and Sterken (Pepp, Michaelson, and Sterken 2019).  
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likely be other outlets that profit from the dissemination of misinformation and refuse to concede 
that such content is inauthentic, thereby catering to an audience that is willing (even eager) to 
consume misinformation.47 Today we see segments of the Internet wherein users are effectively 
partitioned off from credible sources of information. These users participate in echo chambers 
wherein they descend increasingly deeply into narratives that are divorced from reality. While the 
marketplace mechanisms described above may be useful for constraining misinformation 
involving Deepfake content in contexts wherein users are not fully siloed off from credible sources 
that adhere to journalistic norms, they will likely struggle to reign in misinformation in contexts 
where media outlets and their audiences are already deeply steeped in falsehood and are committed 
to narratives that deem conventional information sources untrustworthy.48 These actors may 
simply refuse to recognize misinformation as such, no matter what fact-checking bodies have to 
say about the matter.49 In such contexts, the best outcome one can hope for with respect to 
marketplace solutions is that consumers of misinformation will develop some willingness to 
become exposed to alternative outlets and arguments that are more grounded in reality, and 
ultimately decide to distance themselves from sources of misinformation. It is easy to see why 
many would be pessimistic about the prospect of this taking place on any sort of large scale in the 
near future. 
I will reiterate that these comments about marketplace solutions are intended to be 
supplementary to my discussion about individual rights. I do not wish to give the impression that 
market-oriented solutions are clearly superior to approaches invoking rights. Indeed, it is important 
 
47 It is important to bear in mind that there is a distinction between two different categories of misinformation outlets: those that disseminate 
misinformation because they sincerely believe they are telling the truth, and those that disseminate misinformation, and know that they are 
disseminating misinformation, but do so anyway because it serves their financial interests. My discussion here is inclusive of both categories.  
48
 For a more detailed discussion of how misinformation/disinformation are corrected in the modern media ecosystem, as well as how they are 
permitted to thrive, see Benkler, Faris, and Roberts 2018.  
49 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point about the volume of public demand for misinformation. 
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that philosophers and political theorists work to establish a rights framework that can 
accommodate the rapidly proliferating phenomenon of Deepfake content, and that this work 
inform future decisions by legislators. However, I am comfortable with espousing a two-pronged 
approach to addressing issues involving Deepfake content that highlights the importance of both 
rights theory as well as marketplace solutions, rather than choosing one over the other. 
 It is important to note that in the absence of rights theory, marketplace solutions will likely 
involve a significant degree of arbitrariness and selectivity. Indeed, this sort of dynamic has 
already manifested itself in the context of social media platforms and their decisions regarding 
removal of certain types of content. While many agree that it is legitimate for private social media 
companies to filter out certain types of content (such as misinformative and hateful content), 
decisions to remove content are often met with considerable skepticism, confusion, and even anger 
as users point out inconsistencies in how these decisions are implemented. Marketplace solutions 
may thus be appropriately conceptualized as supplementary strategies for filtering out problematic 
content from online platforms that can complement work being done in the domain of rights theory. 
My hope is that this work will eventually shape legislation in beneficial ways.  
 
(VI) Concluding Remarks 
 No doubt some readers will notice an issue that is conspicuously absent from my 
discussion: the distinction between ordinary individuals and public figures. I understand that in 
certain jurisdictions there are legal distinctions that separate public figures such as celebrities from 
the rest of the population. Much could be said about the concept of the public figure and its 
philosophical implications. I will here limit myself to expressing my skepticism as to whether this 
concept is tenable in light of recent developments in technology and culture. In an age wherein 
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many millions of individuals are routinely publicizing photos and videos of themselves (in addition 
to other details about their lives) via social media in hopes of garnering sizable followings, it 
becomes much more difficult to determine who exactly ought to be categorized as a “public 
figure.” While at one time the question of who is and is not a public figure seemed relatively clear-
cut, I do not believe that this is the case any longer. 
Within the context of contemporary culture, while many individuals may not be celebrities 
per se, they operate in a manner similar to celebrities in that they use digital media as a vehicle for 
establishing and promoting a personal brand. At this moment, the number of social media users 
who identify themselves as “influencers” and “brand ambassadors” continues to proliferate. While 
this type of activity can generate income for social media users, this income can be supplementary; 
not everyone who profits financially from social media does so on a full-time basis. Even 
individuals with perfectly ordinary professional and personal lives are sharing content online in 
hopes of it getting traction and attention from others whom they have never encountered face to 
face. While social media platforms generally give users the option to keep their profiles private, 
many choose to make their profiles public, meaning that anyone with an Internet connection can 
access the content they choose to share. Given that this dynamic is now ubiquitous, and only 
increasing in terms of breadth and depth, I have serious doubts as to whether any authority can 
determine in a sound fashion which segment of a population consists of “public figures” and which 
segment does not. In the modern digital age, the traditional concept of “the public figure” is more 
problematic than is often recognized, and that is why I have sought to avoid it completely 
throughout the preceding discussion. 
 Finally, I must clarify that my view regarding the relative superiority of the Property 
Argument over the Defamation Argument and the Privacy Argument is not intended to preclude 
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the possibility of espousing a hybrid approach wherein the strongest elements of each argument 
are synthesized in some way. I have not undertaken this project here simply because it would 
require a great deal more space than I have available. This discussion is only the first step towards 
formulating practical solutions in a world that is just beginning to adjust to the new reality of 
Deepfake technology. Indeed, my discussion has been animated by a sense that this matter is 
somewhat pressing, and that is why I have sought to propose strategies for grappling with the issue 
that can bypass peripheral philosophical debates and establish a philosophical rights framework 
that is capable of efficiently determining the legitimacy and illegitimacy of various applications of 
Deepfake technology. I have expressed partiality towards the Property Argument because it offers 
a rights framework that is relatively simple and parsimonious. My hope is that this framework will 
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